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518 Squadron and the Key to the D Day Landings!
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The
following account from a Wireless Operator/Air Gunner attached
to 518 Squadron based on the Isle of Tiree in the Inner Hebrides
in WWII has never been published previously. I came by this
story of eight men's bravery as a result of the chance
purchase of an RAF Irvin Flying Jacket, which led me to repatriate
it with its original wartime owner, one Warrant Officer John
Bristow. A part of John's own amazing story is already
published on our website and if you have not already read
it, I commend it to you. When I met John for the first time
he mentioned as well as his brush with death in the North
Atlantic in November 1944, he had previously been directly
involved with an extremely "hush hush" operation
which impacted on the timing and strategy for the allied invasion
of Europe known as Operation Overlord.
The impact of this flight, carried out in horrendous conditions
nearly 60 years ago, is recounted by Warrant Officer G.F.
Wilkes, the Wireless Operator/Air Gunner aboard the same Halifax
in which Warrant Officer Bristow was the navigator. WO Wilkes
is now deceased, but his account lives on as testament to
eight men's dedication and bravery under very difficult
conditions. The following is his story of that Op that has
lost none of its impact in the intervening years:-
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"During
the Second World War I was assigned to 518 Squadron based
at Tiree in the Inner Hebrides, a group of small islands off
the west coast of Scotland. We flew in Handley Page Halifax
aircraft of Coastal Command in the main flying meteorological
patrols out over the North Atlantic. Our skipper Flight Lieutenant
Freddie Green was deemed to be the number one pilot on the
squadron and although I am biased, we his crew, believed we
were the best of the bunch.
In the late evening of 5th June 1944 our crew were summoned
by the Duty Officer to ready ourselves for an urgent and special
briefing. It was to be attended by Wing Commander Morris the
Squadron Commander and Squadron Leader Young the Flight Commander.
It appeared "the flap" required a very special task
to be carried out needing the skills and expertise of the
Squadron's number one crew that was made up of the following
personnel:-
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| Pilot |
Fight Lieutenant F.R. Green |
RAFVR |
Deceased |
| 2nd Pilot |
Flying Officer D. Newton |
RAFVR |
Unknown |
| Flight Engineer |
Flight Sergeant S. Loader |
RAFVR |
Deceased |
| Met Observer |
Flight Sergeant E. Ozaist |
Polish |
Deceased |
| Navigator |
Warrant Officer J. Bristow |
RAFVR |
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| Wireless Operator/Air Gunner |
Warrant Officer J. Drought |
Canadian |
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| Wireless Operator/Air Gunner |
Warrant Officer E. Ellacott |
Canadian |
Deceased |
| Wireless Operator/Air Gunner |
Warrant Officer G. F. Wilkes |
RAFVR |
Deceased |
|
 We soon learned at the briefing this was to be a very special
"Bismuth" patrol - a one off. The first leg
was to be extended to 650 nautical miles out into the Atlantic
then a second leg of 400 nautical miles north east, then the
return flown back to our base, turning on that leg, approximately
150 nautical miles south of Iceland. Instead of the routine
number of ascents to the aircraft's ceiling, we had to
fly in two climbs to approx. 18,000 feet and with one more
extra ascent on the second leg. We were instructed to send
coded weather reports at far more frequent intervals than
normal and especially after each ascent to our operational
ceiling. This almost trebled the workload of the wireless
operator and met observer. We were issued with our flight
charts, recognition signals and identification codes for the
day whereupon we returned to the Sergeant's mess for
the usual pre-flight aircrew meal after which we picked up
our butty boxes and flasks of steaming hot coffee and having
kitted up, we were off.
It
wasn't a long wait before the aircrew truck arrived to
take Freddie and the crew to our dispersal where we found
our faithful Halifax aircraft LL123 standing glistening on
the perimeter in the light rain that was starting to fall.
She was swarming with fitters of all trades making sure everything
was A1 prior to the mission. In my own department the 1154/5
Radio Transmitter was found to have a defective VT40 valve
that was hurriedly changed. Finally we were ready to go and
the skipper fired up the four Bristol Hercules XVI engines,
he was given the thumbs up, chocks away and we were ready
to go.
We taxied to the end of the runway and everything was made
ready for take off. The pilots applied full brakes and the
throttles were pushed to the gate and we could feel and hear
the enormous power and noise of the engines with the airframe
straining and groaning. The green Aldis light was fired, the
brakes released and with the belly tanks slurping their full
load of fuel, we were off! The engines on maximum thrust pressed
us into our crew positions and the aircraft surged forward
for a bumpy half mile down the runway and we were suddenly
airborne. The time was 0550 on 6th June 1944. The skipper
circled the airfield once, we carried out a final radio check
and a course was set for the first leg of the Bismuth mission.
The weather at this stage was moderate.
We
approached 200 nautical miles out and we set down to approximately
50 feet above sea level to take our first set of meteorological
readings. In the meantime the weather had deteriorated quite
rapidly and we had already passed through a front in which
we experienced violent rainstorms and much higher winds than
had been forecasted by the station Met Officer. To take barometrical
readings at a height of only 50 feet in these conditions was
extremely hazardous above a raging and angry Atlantic Ocean.
It seemed at times that those massive waves, with the white
caps forming huge plumes of spray, would engulf the aircraft.
It is recorded that in similar conditions other 518 aircraft
returned to base with bent propellers caused by touching the
wave tips churning below.
It
doesn't take much of an imagination to realise how difficult
it was for Flt Lt Freddie Green to maintain a steady height
of 50 feet above such a tempestuous sea with no horizon to
get a visual on, the cloud base virtually down to sea level
and compounded by heavy and relentless rain. His task was
to hold the aircraft steady for approximately 5 minutes to
assist the Met Observer with his calculations. It took a lot
of skill, daring and guts especially when you consider the
handling difficulties in the Halifax caused by the twin tail
units that didn't take kindly to these adverse weather
conditions and which caused ongoing control problems to our
two pilots when flying at such low levels.
The wind speed had strengthened considerably, way above the
predicted levels and the rain had turned to hail. Meteorological
reports coming from the met observer got longer and longer
and with the buffeting of the aircraft, keying the information
became extremely difficult. Each set of coded figures and
letters had to be repeated twice to Group to ensure accuracy.
When the weather was at its worst, we received a signal from
Group in plain language (this was the first and only time
I had ever heard of non-coded signals being used on an operational
sortie), to the effect that our met observations were so extreme
they couldn't possibly be correct! Flight Sergeant Ozaist,
with Flt Lt Green's permission, replied in very plain
language briefly explaining to the desk wallahs at Group exactly
the conditions we were operating in at that precise time.
The message was concise and to the point - something
along the lines that if they did not believe our hard won
data, they could b****y well come and do the job
themselves!!
Our
navigator, WO John Bristow was also having a very difficult
time of it, keeping us on course and determining our exact
position with wind speeds and drift at this stage being estimated
only by visual observations. The smoke flairs that we dropped
in the very rough seas either became unsighted or were quickly
extinguished. Radio beams from the mainland were only able
to give us very approximate fixes as one of the three transmission
masts was out of service. From the information Bristow could
obtain he was able to establish we were still approximately
on course to an accuracy of plus or minus 50 miles.
Prior
to our final climb on the first leg, we ran into some extreme
weather with lashing hail and rain and with lightning forking
through the clouds into the angry seas around us. Halifax
LL123 made a laborious ascent with the hail turning to sleet
and snow resulting in the airframe icing up forcing the climb
to be aborted at 10,000 feet. We descended slowly into lower
cloud levels whereupon huge chunks of ice started to fly off
various parts of the aircraft and crash worryingly into the
aircraft's fuselage, twin tail units and mid upper gun
turret manned by Warrant Officer "Deac" Ellacott.
Our rear gunner Warrant Officer Jack Drought ensconced in
the "Arse End Charlie" position could see these
massive ice balls shooting past his position and expressed
his "concern" about the situation in very flowery
language over the plane's intercom providing a welcome
diversion for the rest of the crew!
Freddie Green eventually got us down to sea level (and sometimes
below it!) and commenced circling for 10 minutes or so until
the worst of the storm had passed through. He then recommenced
our ascent with heavy snow at some levels slowing the climb
and at 18,000 feet we reached the aircraft's operational
ceiling. The temperatures inside the fuselage were sub zero
and we could only imagine how FS Ozaist felt as he stood within
the glazed nosed section taking and recording his observations.
It was again time to transmit the latest forecast information
back to Group, the job being made even more difficult keying
the messages with fingers stiffening from the cold. Transmissions
were nothing like normal speeds and the skipper had to maintain
our height until all the data had been cleared and acknowledged
by Group.
The
entire crew worked extremely hard under exceptionally poor
conditions, but the pressure had been put on us at the pre-flight
briefing and we did our best to maximise data obtained during
the Op. Not one of us left our posts during those first two
legs of the trip and in my opinion everyone on the crew gave
it their best shot. The two other WOPAG's took it in
turns to man the rear turret, the others keeping the crew
supplied with hot coffee and sandwiches that we took at our
posts.
The winds at our maximum height were in excess of 150 mph
blowing from the west in a south-easterly direction. This
played havoc on Bristow's hopes of keeping us on course,
but as it turned out we discovered after the mission he had
never been far out with his dead reckoning estimates and he
came through with flying colours.
On the second leg we flew across the weather fronts rather
than head into them, although the storm did not show any signs
of abating and it was both turbulent and cold on board, while
our pilots struggled at the controls trying to make the roller
coaster ride for the rest of us as smooth as possible.
On the third and final leg we turned approximately 150 miles
south of Iceland as planned but the weather continued to harass
us. Our Skipper pulled the aircraft up on her final climb
to 18,000 feet but the port outer Hercules engine began to
misfire badly and almost at once it failed completely. Freddie
Green had no choice but to feather the prop and for the rest
of the sortie, and as well as contending with the weather,
he and our second pilot had to fight with the controls to
maintain our course on the remaining three operational engines.
We had another hairy moment when the plane became alive with
the electric fantasy of St Elmo's Fire. The aircraft's
flying surfaces took on a blue hue with dancing lights everywhere
playing havoc with both the navigational instruments and with
radio reception. It was once again down to our pilots to fly
on instinct alone. Two hundred or so miles out from Tiree
we at last managed to pick up radio fixes from our base and
to the relief of WO Bristow, our overworked navigator, was
able to put us on a steady course for home. Our Halifax landed
safely after an Op of 9 hours and 35 minutes. This compares
with an average "Bismuth" patrol of about 7 hours.
It is safe to say the entire crew were extremely grateful
to the navigator as out in the North Atlantic the air crews
of Coastal Command do not get a second chance and the wearing
of parachutes in case of an emergency was regarded as a total
waste of time.
Our
debriefing session was a lengthy affair due to the unprecedented
weather patterns we had found. All our met reports had to
be rechecked with Group for complete accuracy and our pilots
and crew quizzed over the weather conditions that existed
over the northern reaches of the Atlantic. Our Squadron and
Flight Commanders attended the debriefing and congratulated
us all for our efforts and achievements that night.
It was then that we learned that one of the Coastal Command
crews engaged on a met sortie from RAF Brawdy in South Wales
piloted by Flying Officer H. Aveling, had failed to return
to base and was presumed lost at sea with his entire crew
after reporting the same horrendous weather conditions we
had just experienced.
It appeared to those of us who undertook these arduous and
dangerous Met Patrols that our task was regarded as the soft
option for aircrew. If the truth be known, many crews perished
during these operations and when you compare the statistics
between Bomber and Coastal Command, in relation to flying
hours per operation, I don't believe the fatality rate
was significantly different. On 518 Squadron alone, 10 aircraft
"bought it" on Ops during 1944. We unfailingly flew
our tasked missions on either Mercer and Bismuth patrols while
other squadrons would not even consider flying. During '44
we flew every single day of the year except two when heavy
snows prevented take-off, even though both aircrew and ground
staff attempted to clear the runways. Were it physically possible
we would have flown on those two days as well!"
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It was only in retrospect the crew discovered the true importance
of their actions that day back in June 1944. The selection of the
invasion date was restricted as it had to be at low tide, timed
at dawn with a partial moon and most importantly, the weather had
to be set fair. These criteria dictated the invasion for early May
or the first or third week of June. The "window" selected by the
Allied Commanders was the first week of June - the date: 5th June
1944.
 The
weather, however, proved to be the wild card. The forecast for 5th
June was dire. A maximum cloud base of 500 feet and force 5 winds
were predicted for the Channel. Without dominance of the air, the
whole invasion was at risk. The decision to postpone the invasion
for 24 hours was made by General Eisenhower at 0415 on Sunday, 4th
June. This decision proved an opportune one as the weather worsened
all that day. The allied commanders met again at 2130 and all awaited
Group Captain James Stagg, the Chief RAF Meteorologist. He was later
to be quoted "no one could have imagined weather charts less propitious".
He indicated that two depressions were situated over the North Atlantic.
There had, however, been some rapid and unexpected developments
in the general situation, and in two or three hours the rain should
cease followed by up to 36 hours with moderate winds that would
allow limited air operations on 5th June. The bottom line was simple:
adequate weather conditions for an invasion could be anticipated
but for a very limited time before the second front arrived.
Once
Group Captain Stagg had finished his meteorological summary; he
was cross-examined by Eisenhower, Montgomery and others. Could the
forecast be wrong? Had the weather reports been checked with all
the resources available? Finally, Eisenhower asked Stagg "what will
the weather be on the 6th June in the Channel and over the French
coast?" The room fell silent for a full two minutes while Stagg
considered his reply which was "to answer that question would make
me a guesser, not a meteorologist!"
Group Captain Stagg returned to the room at 0415 on Monday, 5th
June when he advised Ike "I think we have a gleam of hope for you
sir". He confirmed the depression in the Atlantic was moving west
faster than expected. The latest met reports suggested the front
passing through late that day with falling winds and a cloud base
of 3000 feet. A full eight minutes passed before General Dwight
D. Eisenhower broke the silence and spoke in a very quiet voice
"OK let’s go". Operation Overlord, the invasion of Europe was on.
The allies had a window of opportunity lasting a maximum of 36 hours
after which the second depression would sweep in over the Channel.
It was a "now or never" decision.
It can be reported, as can be seen from the story of Halifax LL123
and the crew from 518 Squadron Coastal Command, that they provided
the critical data on the second cold front. The information they
transmitted from the eye of the storm Tuesday, June 6th had a very
direct bearing on the destiny of some 7000 vessels, 3,000 aircraft
and no less than 250,000 allied airmen, soldiers and sailors.
It
was some time after the end of the war that 518 Squadron’s crest
was finally approved by the Air Council and duly authorised by Her
Majesty the Queen. It consisted of a clenched fist holding a key,
the implication being that 518 Squadron held the key, thus giving
the planners all the necessary information they required for the
planning and implementation for the invasion and subsequent liberation
of Europe.
The impact of this mission had clearly stuck with WO Wilkes in
the intervening years and it is apparent he felt, I think with some
justification, that Churchill’s comments concerning the "Few" could
equally well be applied to the performance of Coastal Command. While
they operated in the main away from the public gaze and media attention,
this should in no way detract from their dedicated endeavours as
Wilkes’ description of this single mission illustrates. The critical
importance of their role and the dangers they faced should never
be underestimated.
In talking recently with the navigator of Halifax LL123, John Bristow,
he told me that as a young man of 23 he could not believe how he
handled the pressures and technicalities of guiding his pilots and
crew deep out into the blackness of the North Atlantic and then
returning men and machine safely back to Tiree. The lives of seven
colleagues depended upon the accuracy of his calculations and plots.
I hope in some way, by publishing this account here for the first
time shortly before the 60th Anniversary of the D Day Landings,
we may at last give thanks and appreciation for the contribution
made by the crew of Halifax LL123 and all the other unsung heroes
of RAF Coastal Command.
I will let WO Gordon Wilkes have the final words in this saga:-
| We were part of the "Few" who risked their lives
in a different way from the boys in Spitfires and Lancasters,
but never forget our tasks in the RAF were strategically as
important. We were never glamorised on the front page of the
daily newspapers or talked about in clubs or bars, but we were
always there whatever the weather and in June 1944 "we held
the key…." |
Acknowledgements
This story is based on a longhand report written after the event
by Warrant Officer Gordon Wilkes RAFVR now sadly deceased. Without
his foresight in recording his memories, this critical account may
have been lost forever.
I should also like to thank Warrant Officer John Bristow RAFVR
(Rtd.) in giving me his time freely and with good humour and in
recounting his memories of this Op and others. In addition, he has
allowed me to use this personal archive to bring this story to life.
Finally, I have also been assisted by the one other known surviving
member of the crew of LL123, Warrant Officer Jack Drought RCAF (Rtd.),
who has provided some very useful anecdotes from his home in Canada.
I hope Flight Lieutenant Freddie Green and the remainder of the
crew would have approved of this feature and my report on their
mission.
Geoff Pringle
December 2003
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